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NATURAL LAW AND
THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITYt
D. P.

O'CONNELL*

MODERN TERMS, sovereignty is but the ultimate competence within
a prescribed juridical order. It does not follow that it can be equated
with irresponsibility or absence of obligation. While the State is sovereign it cannot be insulated from its fellow States, but must share their
life, their common end - the common good of humanity - an end objectively predicated on the nature of man. According to Suarez:
N

The human race, into howsoever many different peoples and kingdoms
it may be divided, always preserves a certain unity ....

Each one of these

States is also, in a certain sense, and viewed in relation to the human
race, a member of that universal society; for these States when standing
alone are never so self-sufficient that they do not require some mutual
association and intercourse, at times for their own greater welfare and
advantage, but at other times because also of some moral necessity or
need. This fact is made manifest by actual usage.1
When Suarez distinguishes, therefore, between the society of men and the
society of nations, he still emphasizes the "sociability" of international
relationships and asserts the necessity of a law to govern them. Here is
the answer to the speculations of Professor Julius Stone, who wonders
if the present division of the world into two camps, each culturally
insulated from the other, and called respectively the "West" and the
"Iron Curtain" has dissolved the international community and substituted
for it two communities each with its own law, the product of its own
ideology. 2 To Suarez the mere co-existence of the two camps induces
society and hence law. What is novel and modern in his doctrine is the
transformation of the jus gentium into the jus inter gentes. Until this

transformation was effected there could be no such thing as international
law as we understand it.
t Based on an article by the same author entitled Rational Foundations of International Law, 2 SYDNEY L. REV. 253 (1957).
B.A., LL.M., Ph.D., Reader in Law, University of Adelaide, Australia.
1 De Leg. II, c19, n.9. This notion is again fundamental in Lorimer, I, p. 357. See
Jenks, "The Significance Today of Lorimer's Ultimate Problem of International
Jurisprudence," in (1950) 26 Transactions of the Grotius Society, 35.
2 Legal Controls of InternationalConflict (1954) 6 1

5
Jus Gentium. and Jus Naturale
The term "jus gentium" in Roman law
was used in several senses but at no time
was its relationship with jus naturale clearly
defined. Gaius and Ulpian sought to give a
philosophical account of the principles of
law acknowledged by the praetor peregrinus
in cases dealing with aliens or subject peoples. They found these principles common
to all nations, and to this extent 'distinguished them from municipal law. But this
jus gentiym was not, and could not 'clearly
be marked off from jus naturale at the one
end and positive law at the other. Since the
basic principles of the jus gentium, life, right
to property and its disposition, the concepts
of theft, fraud etc., could be regarded as
necessary conclusions from the principles
of the jus naturale, it might be said that jus
gentium partook of jus naturale. But as a
comprehensive system of law considered as
an adjunct to the jus civile, and containing
detailed rules about sale and inheritance,
(such as the coincidence of animus and
factum in acquisition of a res nullius) jus
gentium was also as much a human invention as the jus civile (which, of course, operated between cives).3 In one sense, then,
jus gentium to the early medieval writers
was a term to describe those practical precepts which are common to diverse bodies
of municipal law mediating between the
principles of natural law and the rules of
municipal law4 (for which the term "jus
civile" came to be employed, devoid of its
Dabin, Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch
and Dabin (1940) 430.
4 It is to be noted, however, that Isidore of Seville
included in jus gentium much of international
law, such as diplomatic immunity, occupation of
territory, treaties and prisoners of war (Encyclopaedia, V): Bowle, Western Political' Thought
(1949) 152.
3
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technical associations with citizenship in
Roman law). In another sense, it referred
to a highly elaborated technical system of
5
positive law.
The emphasis in Aquinas, whose treatise
on law in the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologica was the framework of all
later medieval jurisprudence, was on the
former aspect of jus gentium, but much refinement of his text is necessary before the
exact role of jus gentium in his doctrine
can be detected. (What follows can best be
understood by reference to the appended
chart which tentatively indicates the steps
in the reasoning by which the absolute principle of natural law is applied to relative
and contingent circumstances in an English
law context. The stage which Aquinas defines as jus gentium perhaps becomes clearer
on analysis of this chart). Aquinas distinguishes between two faculties of the intellect, the speculative (cognoscere) and the
practical (dirigere);O the speculative is concerned with knowledge alone; the practical,
which is the intellect plus the will, applies
that knowledge to actions. It is obvious that
law pertains to the practical intellect since
it concerns the actions that direct men to the
end which is speculatively apprehended.
On the medieval inheritance from Roman lawyers see generally Mcllwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West (1932) 119-131, 326ff.;
Carlyle, A History of PoliticalTheory in the West
(1928), Vol. 5, P.I., cc. 4, 5, 6; II, cc. I & 2;
Barker's introduction to Gierke, Natural Law and
the Theory of Society (1934), Vol. 1, XXVIIIff.;
Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe
(1909).
6 It is sometimes supposed that he believed in two
intellects. This, however, is not so. He is considering the intellect from two points of view,
firstly, considering it in itself, and secondly, considering it in union with the will. The intellect
considered in itself is the speculative intellect,
which is concerned with knowing things, which it
does (a) by apprehending (synderesis) (A in
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Aquinas distinguishes several successive acts
of the intellect and will which precede every
action. The first act of the intellect is the
simple grasp of an axiomatic truth ("seek
the good and avoid evil"); this is a "primary
truth" from which "secondary truths" are
syllogistically derived (seek the social good
- the minor premise being the social nature of man); from the "secondary truths"
other conclusions can be drawn, some of
which are "necessary" in that they do not
depend upon existing conditions (e.g.,
"theft" considered in the abstract is always
immoral since it arises from the right to
property, which is an aspect of man's social
nature), and others of which are contingent
since they arise out of the state of society
at a given time (e.g., whether "theft" is an
operative concept will depend upon whether
Table B of the chart); (b) by judging (B); and
(c) by deducing conclusions syllogistically (C
and D.) The intellect in union with the will is
the practical intellect. By command of the will
the intellect applies itself to particular cases.
Aquinas' thesis may be illustrated by the following
table:
Order of Intention
Acts of intellect
1. Judgment: this end is desirable.
2. Judgment: this end can and must be obtained.
Acts of will
3. Desire (inefficacious).
4. Efficacious intention: I desire this end.
Acts regarding means of attainment:
A. Order of Choice
5. Deliberation: these means seem apt for the
end.
6. Consent to these means.
7. Practical judgment regarding the best method.
8. Choice of this method.
B. Order of Execution
9. Command: the means chosen must* be applied.
10. Active use of the will moving faculties.
11. Attainment of the end desired.
12. Fruition of will, the end being attained.
*This must comes from the will, which makes
the order of execution the realm of the practical
intellect.

society has based itself upon a division of
property or a community of property: in
the one case the rule will be "do not steal
from your neighbour": in the other "do
not steal from society"). The contingent
conclusions must be then applied to more
particular circumstances (e.g., rules to make
the notion of theft effective), or applied
to singular instances hic et nunc. 7 At the

conclusion level (C), the inferences are
logically necessary and direct. At the determination level (D, E, F), the prescribed
or prohibited actions are neither just nor
unjust intrinsically but become so in virtue
8
of the determination.
Jus naturale, jus gentium and jus civile
in Aquinas are to be distinguished according to the judgment in which each consists.
The first consists of evident conclusions
from the first truths of human nature and
its end teleologically conceived. The jus
gentium is said to consist of conclusions
drawn from these first principles, and the
jus civile of determinations of means in a
general way by reference to the generality
of contingent circumstances (positive or
municipal law).9 Aquinas distinguishes the
two modes of derivation from the natural
law: "by way of conclusions from the premises," and "by way of determinations of
certain generalities."' 10 This, however, does
not greatly illuminate the role of jus gentium. Is it the equivalent of the secondary
or more immediately concluded principles
7 The distinction is usually stated as between the
immutable principles of natural law and the fallible but necessary deductions made from them,
but this telescopes the problem.
8 For critical investigation of this epistemological
basis of natural law see the excellent essay of Mortimer Adler, "A Question about Law" in Essays
in Thomism, ed. Brennan (1942).
9 S.T., I, 11, q.95, aa. 2, 3, 4.
10 S.T. I-IL, q.95, a.2..
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of the natural law (e.g., right to life), or is
it the sum total of those jurisprudential concepts which all nations have in common
because realizations of these derived principles (e.g., murder, theft, fraud)? The reference to the principles of just sale suggests
the second alternative, but the further statement that the precept "thou shalt not kill"
is both a moral precept and a proposition of
jus gentium1 suggests that the two stages of
reasoning are in fact bridged by the one
concept.
Much of this difficulty of definition is due
to Aquinas' efforts to escape from the confusion between natural law as a notion of
moral conduct and natural law as the equivalent of the law of the jungle which Ulpian
introduced 12 and Aquinas inherited through
Justinian.1 3 Ulpian had said that natural
law is what nature teaches all animals. But
since animals are not rational, this can
only refer to animal instinct. The moral
law, however, is concerned with choice of
conduct, and with what men "ought to do"
as distinct from what animals "actually do."
When Aquinas 4 distinguishes jus gentium
as "derived from natural law by way of conclusions that are not very remote from their

COMMUNITY

premises" he is separating it from "that
natural law which is common to all animals." It then becomes clear that jus gentium is equated with the broader principles
of the natural law and hence is not contained
under human positive law. 5 Jus gentium is
thus neither international law nor what the
Romans understood as an adjunct of their
municipal law. It does not proceed from
human officials exercising extrinsic authority
conjoined with power over the individual,
which is the characteristic of positive law,",
and thus it is prior to the constitution of the
State."
The way was now prepared for Suarez's
description of the law of nations as deriving
from the common consensus of sovereigns
acting as organs of the peoples who, by use
and custom, introduce law.18 Jus gentium
now is not natural but human, positive law
founded on a concordance of wills manifested in a conjunction of usages, and differing from civil law (municipal law) only in
15 The ambiguity is heightened by his quotation
in I-I, q.94, a.4 of Isidore of Seville (Etym. v.4),
who said that natural law is common to all nations. There is the further ambiguity that from
natural law two conclusions can be drawn: (a)
those which define the means in the sphere of

private conduct, and (b) those which define the
11 S.T. I-I, q.95, aa.2 & 4. For a similar modern
ambiguous statement in relation to property see
Maclaren, Private Property and the Natural Law,
Aquinas Papers (1948) 14.
12 Inst. D.1, 1, 2-3. Generally see D'Entr~ves,
Natural Law (1951) 25ff.
13

Pandect. 1, tit. 1.

14

S.T. 1-It, q.95, a.4, reply to obj. 1.

Aquinas distinguishes generally natural law considered in itself as absolute (jus naturale secunduni prim un nioduin), which is universal and applies to all men and animals (such as the instincts
of procreation or self-preservation) and the
natural law induced from self-evident principles
and specific to man (jus naturale secundum moduni). Barcia Trelles considers the latter as equivalent in his text to jus gentium.

means in the sphere of public conduct. It is clear
that jus gentium has reference to the latter only,
and is a social concept: Adler, A Dialectic of
Morals, c.6.
16 S.T. 1-11, q.96, a.5; q.90,,a.3, reply to obj. 3;
II-II, q. 57, a.2 reply to obj. 2.
See the distinction between legal and moral
obligation in S.T. I-I, q.99, a.5; Maritain, Scholasticisn and Politics (1940), 92-3; Farrell, "The
Roots of Obligation" in The Thoinist (1939) vol.
1, 14-30.
17 This despite the fact that Aquinas elsewhere
divides positive law into jus gentium and jus
civile, S.T. 1-1I, q.95, a.4: Simon, The Nature
and Function of Society (1940) n.10.
'8 De Leg. It, c.19, n.6. Lord Russell of Killowen,
"International Law" (1896) 12 L.Q.R. 320; Barcia Trelles in Hague Rec. loc. cit. ch.3.

5

the subjects to which it addresses itself. He
establishes this by a series of dialectical
steps beginning with a repudiation of Ulpian's definition.' 9 Natural law does not
dictate for the advantage of natural instinct.
This is proved in the case of man by the
fact that when natural law does enjoin anything to preserve natural instinct it always
involves a rational means. There are many
things which natural law prohibits to men
but not to brutes, for example, union between mother and son. There is thus no need
to use jus gentium to' describe the moral
law; jus naturale suffices for this. Nor is it
legitimate to regard jus gentium as a set of
principles deduced as an act of intrinsic necessity from the more fundamental principles of jus naturale, differing from the latter
only in being revealed by means of comparatively intricate inferences as opposed to
merely simple reflection. So to do would be
to confer on the usages of men, contrived
by free will, the character of moral absoluteness enjoyed by jus naturale. It is true
that many of the institutions traditionally
described as of the jus gentium, such as the
proposition pacta sunt servanda, follow
upon natural law, but they do so only in
conjunction with the assumption of the existence of human society and circumstances
peculiar to it. For instance, pacta sunt servanda presupposes the existence of commercial intercourse and the actual making
of a promise, both social acts: The concept
of theft presupposes that society has organized itself on a basis of divisio rerum and
not community of property. The inference,
therefore, from the natural law (stages A &
B of the table) to the propositions .of jus
gentium (D) is dependent upon the intervention of human free will and of moral
19 De Leg. II, c.17, n.2-3.
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expediency and is not a matter of logical
necessity. 20 And since immutability derives
from objective necessity it follows that the
jus gentium is not immutable. 21 Nor is it
necessarily common to all, as is natural law,
22
but regulariteret fere omnibus.
The Positive Character of Jus Gentium
At this point Suarez seems to be fixing
jus gentium at stage D, and possibly at stage
E, 23 of the table, and so clarifying Aquinas
by a more precise choice of terms. Jus gentium now appears as a stage of reasoning
intermediate between natural law and positive law in general. How is it transformed
into international law? Suarez says that jus
gentium has a twofold form: it is a body of
24
laws (this suggests perhaps stage E )
which individual States observe within their
own borders but which are similar and commonly accepted; it is also the law which
20 De Leg. I1, c. 17, n.9.
21 Ibid. Also c.19, n.2; c.20, n.1.

22 Id., c.19, nn. 1-2. Suarez interprets Aquinas'
statement that the precepts of jus gentium are
conclusions drawn from the principles of natural
law by saying that they are conclusions not in an
absolute sense, and by necessary inference, but in
comparison with the specific determinations of
civil and private law; 11, c.20, n.2, see Copleston,
A History of Philosophy, vol. 3 (1953) 392. This
is reading a good deal into Aquinas.
23 This certainly appears to be the case from his
citation of Isidore's examples of jus gentium as
including contracts and postlirninin; ibid., c.19,

n.10.
24 The interaction of intellect and will in Suarez
may be examined from the Table. To stage D the
process is one of syllogistic deduction; it is judgment, therefore of the intellect. At stage D it is
still judgment but in association with contingencies introduced by volition. At stage F the process
is one of choice, hence of the will: e.g., pacta
sunt servanda can be satisfied by either specific
performance or restitution. In Suarez the choice
is limited by the judgment made, and in this sense
the law is not totally will. In Austin the will is unanchored from the judgment; law becomes totally
will.
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various nations ought to observe in their
relations with each other. 25 There is no inherent ambiguity in this equivocal use of the
term, although there is no doubt considerable inconvenience (Suarez does carefully
distinguish the two uses 26). The reason is
that at this fundamental stage the basic concepts of international and municipal law
must be the same. This emerges more
clearly in his demonstration that the jus
gentium, like natural law, may not only enjoin conduct by positive precepts (preceptive law), but also concede and sanction
things (concessive law). For example, one
is not obliged to take a wife, but if one does
the resulting status relationship, though
freely produced by consent, is governed by
natural law as to indissolubility, support
and education of children, etc. In the same
way, jus gentium may concede that nations
may do certain things, but the juridical character of the thing done may be independent
of the wills of the acting States. So diplomatic immunity is not a necessary derivative
of. natural law, but the infringement of it
would threaten the stability of international
relations and derogate from the natural harmony of society. 27 In the case of treaties
there is joined to the right to contract an
obligation not to violate the bargain. 28 The
institutions of jus gentium whether they be
of international or municipal law are to this
extent anchored to the natural law.
The ontological basis, or to put it less
philosophically the source of obligation, of
a law created by concordance of wills of
sovereigns is thus clear. The positivists were
later to confront themselves with the questions, why should not the withdrawal of
25
26

Id., c.19, n.8.
Id., c.20, n.l.

27 1d., c.19, n.7.
28

Id., c.18, n.5.

consensus dispel obligation; why, if the law
of nations is the consensus of "nearly all"
nations should the non-consenting or the
recalcitrant be obliged? Suarez's answer to
these questions depends on his conception
of the international community and the role
of natural law in sanctioning the jus gentium. Just as man is social, so is he juridical. 29 Although men are divided into
various nations they preserve the same
moral and quasi-political unity, so that
though perfect in themselves States are also
members of the human race and dependent
to a great degree upon each other.
Consequently such communities have
need of some system of law whereby they
may be directed and properly ordered with
regard to this kind of intercourse and asso-'
ciation; and although that guidance is in
large measure provided by natural reason, it
is not provided in sufficient measure and in
direct manner with respect to all matters;
therefore, it was possible for certain special
rules of law to be introduced through the
practice of these same nations. For just as in
one State or province law is introduced by
custom, so among the human race as a whole
it was possible for laws to be introduced by
the habitual conduct of nations. This was
the more feasible because the matters comprised within the law in question are few,
very closely related to natural law and most
easily deduced therefrom in a manner so
advantageous and so in harmony with nature
itself that, while this derivation [of the law
of nations from natural law] may not be selfevident, that is, not essentially and absolutely
required for moral rectitude - it is nevertheless quite in accord with nature, and universally acceptable for its own sake. 30
Le Fur, "Le Droit naturel ou objectif; s'tend-il
aux rapports internationaux?" in (1925) 6 Revue
de droit international et de ldgislation comparde
(30 ser.) 61; also "La Thdorie de droit naturel"
29

in (1927) 18 Recueil de l'Acaddfnie de droit international 271.
30 De Leg. 11, c. 19. n.9.
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Natural law is thus the integrating factor
in the international community. Nonetheless Suarez has not worked out his theory of
interaction in a completely satisfactory
manner, and in the result his doctrine has a
pendular character as the argument swings
back and forth. 31 For example, the law of
war is governed ultimately by natural law,
but so is the right to commerce. The one
must derogate from the other. Suarez says
nations may go to war because peoples can
live without commerce, whereas he has already said, following Vitoria, that they cannot co-exist without mutual aid (caritas)
and communication. This supposed tension,
however, is capable of being resolved. and
the problem is no more than an interpolation in Suarez's stream of thought. Westlake makes the added criticism that Suarez
does not distinguish between good and bad
customs but allows all custom the force of
law. 32 This is a misapprehension of Suarez's
Scholastic position and also a misreading of
his text. 33 A bad (injusta) custom would
not be law any more than a lex injusta. A
more cogent comment is that Suarez does
not elaborate the content of his jus gentium. 34 It was not his concern to do so. He
was writing philosophy, or as he said himself, theology, and he cited only the'obvious
examples to explain the ontological character of laws between nations; and even this
was a very subordinate aspect to a much
larger work on law generally.
The real importance of Suarez is thus his
Lacambra, loc. cit. 31. See generally Nys, Les
Droits de la guerre et les pr~curseurs de Grotius
(1882).
32 Collected Papers (1914) 28.
33 De Leg. II, c.20, n.3. There is in fact a whole
chapter devoted' to the question: Ibid. VII c.6.
Sherwood, "Francisco Suarez" in (1927)
12
Transactions of the Grotius Society 19.
34 Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of
Nations (1947) 67.
31

clarification of the distinctions between, and
the inter-relationship of, natural law and
international law. The distinction was almost immediately obscured again by Grotius, who, while elaborating the content of
international law, was weak on ontology.
He adopted the proposition of Vasquez, the
Spanish Augustinian, that rational nature,
irrespective of the positive will of God, is
the primary ground of the obligation of natural law, 35 and while admitting36 that the
natural law is enjoined by God, went on to
say that it would oblige even if there were
no God.3 So far he and Aquinas are not in
radical disagreement, but the emphasis thus
placed on the autonomy of the intellect led
in his successors in the Age of Reason to an
exaggeration of the capacity of the intellect
to deduce with absolute moral certainty the
detailed rules of law. They followed him
closely in believing it possible to derive by
strict logic a suitable system of rational law
containing specific prescriptions covering
debts and property, family institutions and
inheritance, all sharing the immutability of
the first principle of natural law and so having the force of moral obligation. 38 This was
a doctrine far removed from that of Suarez
who regarded only the general institutions
of marriage, property and contract as contained under natural law and would have
allowed a considerable relativity to the detailed prescriptions accommodating the institutions to contingent circumstances.
International and Municipal Law
What of the inter-relationship of international law and municipal law in the
Suarezian system? It would be invidious to
35 Chroust, "Hugo Grotius and the Scholastic
Natural Law Tradition," in (1934)

17 The New

Scholasticissa I14.
36
De lure Belli ac Pacis, I, C.1, X.2, 2.
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treat of this question in the light of the
modern doctrines of Kelsen, Verdross and
Triepel. The problem as such is not formally discussed by Suarez and his attitude
to it can only be gathered from his views on
the nature and role of the respective legal
orders. It would be surprising if out of such
analysis a consistent and comprehensive
theory would emerge, since Suarez does not,
of course, treat of the matter in the logicaljuridical fashion of today, which is an
outcome of the Kantian dichotomy of jurisprudence and metaphysics, but in an ethical-juridical fashion. It is therefore possible
to find in him arguments that favour both
monism and dualism. The key to his general
attitude is found in his discussion of the
processes by which the jus gentium can be
changed. He begins by repeating that there
are two forms of jus gentium, the jus intragentes and the jus inter-gentes. The former
is no more than the usages introduced
throughout the world by successive acts of
mutual imitation because they are expressive of or in harmony with the natural law
and so befitting to all nations individually
and collectively. The latter is similar to the
former in its institutions, for the same
reason, but is the produce of imitation by
nations considered as entities and not as
aggregations. 39 From this distinction it
follows that the jus intra-gentes is easily
changed by any one State since within that
State it is no more than civil law, although in a fundamental sense. So a State
may decree that unjust sales shall be rescinded or its citizens not use certain currency, and it may do this without the
consent of other States. 40 Changes in the
37

38
39
40

Prolog. to id., 11.
Rommen, The Natural Law (1947)
De Leg. III, c.20, n.].
Id. 11, c.20, n.7.

chs. 3 & 4.
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jus inter-gentes are, however, much more
difficult, "for this phrase involves law common to all nations and appears to have been
introduced by the authority of all, so that it
may not be annulled without universal consent. Nevertheless, there would be no inherent obstacle to change, in so far as the
subject-matter of such law is concerned, if
all nations should agree to the alteration, or
if a contrary custom should gradually come
'41
into practice and prevail.
It is clear then that if the State contributes to the modification and alteration of
any precept of the law of nations tending
to introduce new custom, it is acting in this
case as a member of the international community. In a sense it is acting as an organ
of that community, not repudiating its law.
The question is by no means resolved with
clarity but there can be little doubt that
Suarez is tending here to the primacy of the
international order. This theoretical supremacy derives as logical inference from
the proximity of international law to the
natural law, which is ex hypothesi superior
to the civil law since more intimately related
to the end of man; and the consequent ethical-juridical impossibility that the political
community could derogate from what is
common to all nations. Man as a citizen is
governed by municipal law, but man as man
emerges beyond the confines of municipal
law and partakes of the wider community
of the societas gentium. It would follow
that the law of nations, a's the expression of
the being of the international community,
must be situated on a plane higher than
municipal law.
this, however, is very far from putting
Suarez in a modern monistic position. The
national order is not a derivation from the
international. Suarez had expressly rejected
41 Id. 1I, c.20, n.8.

5
this when repudiating an institutional civilas maxima, and it would be a negation
of all his thought to treat of the authority of
the prince as a delegation from international
law. Internal sovereignty is not dependent
upon the grace of the world order; the State
has integrity and is no mere administrative
agency. Therefore, there is a sphere, it
would seem, beyond the supremacy of international law, just as international law,
deriving its juridical character from a source
other than the initiating wills of the sovereigns who formulate it, is beyond the control of municipal law. There is thus in
Suarez an initial dualism of sources, although it is not a dualism in the modern
sense. Modern dualism regards the sources
as mutually exclusive and opposes them to
each other so as to initiate a collision of
rights and obligations. The only passage in
Suarez suggestive of such a doctrine is one
where he argues that the State may ordain
that an international law shall not be observed. From his illustration of the rule of
the jus gentium as to slavery of prisoners of
war, which is not observed among Christians, 42 it would seem, however, that he is
thinking of concessive international law and
not preceptive. A thorough-going dualism,
involving a hypothetical collision of international and municipal law would be incompatible with his notions of the naturally
harmonious ends of State and societas
gentium.
A proper inteipretation of Suarez's doctrine of the international community would
tend to place him midway between the monistic and dualistic schools. In this, as in
much else, Suarez is coming into his own.
Contemporary theory avoids the extremes
of monism and dualism. On the one hand
42

Ibid.

CATHOLIC LAWYER,

SUMMER

1959

the independence of States in their domestic concerns is preserved in the United Nations Charter; on the other hand, the
tendency to substitute the individual for the
State as the subject of international law, at
least in some areas of discussion, notably
the rights of man, genocide conventions
etc., imply a corresponding restriction on
sovereignty. The logic of this has yet to be
worked out, but as Suarez's work constantly
emphasizes, logic alone is insufficient; the
problems of the respective roles of State
and international society are at bottom
metaphysical.
Conclusion
Suarez's work has been the centre of controversy largely because it attempts to
grapple in an intelligible manner with the
problem of the interaction of law and
morality. The question is, of course, central
to the philosophy of international law, and
if Suarez does not state his position with
unimpeachable clarity this is attributable
more to. the magnitude and the elusiveness
of the issue than to any logical or linguistic
deficiency in his writings. His critics find
that the tension he sets up between sovereignty and the community of men is unresolved, or rather is resolved only by an
inconsistent shifting of emphasis in pendular fashion from one concept to the other.
These would, in the more extreme instances,
banish from the literature of international
law either the word "sovereignty" or the
conception of the societas gentium according to their respective doctrinal starting
points. But as Suarez clearly recognized, the
abolition of either expression would not
solve the problem, which is real and not
semantic, of the existence of politically insulated communities in close and constant
intercourse with each other. Fundamentally,

NATURAL
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Suarez's doctrine pivots on the notion that
law can be an autonomous discipline, logically disassociated from ethics though evaluated by it. Just as in economics the law of
supply and demand can be discussed without being treated as an extension of metaphysics, so there is an area of positive law
that can be subjected to its own grammar
and analysed on its own postulates.
It is in this that Suarez is modern. The
medievalist accepted law as a manifestation
of ethics, and constructed a society in which
the potential collision of law and morality
was minimised. To continue the formal integration once the collision had become actual was to avoid and not facilitate solution.
Suarez would not deny the point of intersection of law and morality but he would
locate it at only the most fundamental level,
leaving a great deal in the actual construction of the content of law to free human
will. The basic postulates of any legal system, the law in the widest sense, remain
constant because reflections of the natural
law engraven, as Aquinas put it, on the
hearts of men, but the deductions made
therefrom have a relativity conditioned by
various environmental and traditional fac-

COMMUNITY

tors. Where Suarez parts company with the
modern sovereignty schools is in his emphasis on conscience, the moral sense of obligation which is a product of the human
reason reflecting upon the common good,
and which anchors law in its actual operation to metaphysics. In this he has a great
many legal historians and sociologists on
his side. In the outcome the absence of coercive authority in the international community becomes irrelevant, since sanction
is seen as consequential and not conditional.
The pattern of life of the community, the
product of natural love and mercy as much
as of self-interest, can be disciplined and
explained within the context of a legal system dependent on moral sense. In this
Suarez is much nearer reality than modern
writers who found international life on acquisitive and racial principles alone. The
nationalism that within the past century
or so has added a dynamic to Bodin's sovereignty is probably no more than an
ephemeral phenomenon in the history of
civilization, and there is evidence that the
more basic human instinct to society is reasserting itself as the consequences of the
self-interest thesis become more apparent.

5

218

CA~hIL,

LAYR

SUMER1959

0u

Ilk

